CVE-2024-53290
Mié, 11/12/2024 – 08:15
CVE-2024-53290
CVE-2024-53290
Mié, 11/12/2024 – 08:15
CVE-2024-53290
CVE-2024-53289
Mié, 11/12/2024 – 08:15
CVE-2024-53289
CVE-2023-37395
Mié, 11/12/2024 – 03:15
CVE-2023-37395
CVE-2024-53957
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53957
CVE-2024-53956
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53956
CVE-2024-53955
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53955
CVE-2024-53958
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53958
CVE-2024-53960
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53960
CVE-2024-53959
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 22:15
CVE-2024-53959
CVE-2024-55655
Mar, 10/12/2024 – 23:15
CVE-2024-55655
Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is *low*, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a *new* entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable.