CVE-2024-53782
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53782
CVE-2024-53782
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53782
CVE-2024-53121
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53121
net/mlx5: fs, lock FTE when checking if active
The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs:
– Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function
to NULL and unlock the FTE.
– Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and
remove it from the xarray.
However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same
match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the
hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during
subsequent rule deletions.
To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock,
which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to
an FTE that is in the process of deletion.
[ 438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func
[ 438.968205] ————[ cut here ]————
[ 438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
[ 438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower]
[ 438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8
[ 438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90
[ 438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0
[ 438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0
[ 438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0
[ 438.980607] FS: 00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 438.983984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[ 438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 438.986507] Call Trace:
[ 438.986799]
[ 438.987070] ? __warn+0x7d/0x110
[ 438.987426] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.987877] ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190
[ 438.988261] ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
[ 438.988659] ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[ 438.989054] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 438.989458] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 438.989883] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[ 438.990348] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.990932] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.991519] ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.992054] ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
[ 438.992407] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993037] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.993623] mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994161] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core]
[ 438.994728] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190
[ 438.995150] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.995650] fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower]
[ 438.996105] tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0
[ 438.996503] ? __
—truncated—
CVE-2024-53120
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53120
net/mlx5e: CT: Fix null-ptr-deref in add rule err flow
In error flow of mlx5_tc_ct_entry_add_rule(), in case ct_rule_add()
callback returns error, zone_rule->attr is used uninitiated. Fix it to
use attr which has the needed pointer value.
Kernel log:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000110
RIP: 0010:mlx5_tc_ct_entry_add_rule+0x2b1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
…
Call Trace:
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x140
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? mlx5_tc_ct_entry_add_rule+0x2b1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
? mlx5_tc_ct_entry_add_rule+0x1d5/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_tc_ct_block_flow_offload+0xc6a/0xf90 [mlx5_core]
? nf_flow_offload_tuple+0xd8/0x190 [nf_flow_table]
nf_flow_offload_tuple+0xd8/0x190 [nf_flow_table]
flow_offload_work_handler+0x142/0x320 [nf_flow_table]
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x15b/0x2b0
process_one_work+0x16c/0x320
worker_thread+0x28c/0x3a0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xb8/0xf0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
CVE-2024-53711
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53711
CVE-2024-53710
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53710
CVE-2024-53709
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53709
CVE-2024-53708
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53708
CVE-2024-53707
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53707
CVE-2024-53123
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53123
mptcp: error out earlier on disconnect
Eric reported a division by zero splat in the MPTCP protocol:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6094 Comm: syz-executor317 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00291-g05b92660cdfe #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x5b4/0x1310 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3163
Code: f6 44 01 e3 89 df e8 9b 75 09 f8 44 39 f3 0f 8d 11 ff ff ff e8
0d 74 09 f8 45 89 f4 e9 04 ff ff ff e8 00 74 09 f8 44 89 f0 99 7c
24 14 41 29 d6 45 89 f4 e9 ec fe ff ff e8 e8 73 09 f8 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc900041f7930 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000017e67 RBX: 0000000000017e67 RCX: ffffffff8983314b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff898331b0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000005d6000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000017e67
R10: 0000000000003e80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000003e80
R13: ffff888031d9b440 R14: 0000000000017e67 R15: 00000000002eb000
FS: 00007feb5d7f16c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007feb5d8adbb8 CR3: 0000000074e4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0x3e7/0x4b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1493
mptcp_rcv_space_adjust net/mptcp/protocol.c:2085 [inline]
mptcp_recvmsg+0x2156/0x2600 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2289
inet_recvmsg+0x469/0x6a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:885
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1051 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x1b2/0x250 net/socket.c:1073
__sys_recvfrom+0x1a5/0x2e0 net/socket.c:2265
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2283 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2279 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2279
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7feb5d857559
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007feb5d7f1208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007feb5d8e1318 RCX: 00007feb5d857559
RDX: 000000800000000e RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007feb5d8e1310 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff81000000
R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007feb5d8e131c
R13: 00007feb5d8ae074 R14: 000000800000000e R15: 00000000fffffdef
and provided a nice reproducer.
The root cause is the current bad handling of racing disconnect.
After the blamed commit below, sk_wait_data() can return (with
error) with the underlying socket disconnected and a zero rcv_mss.
Catch the error and return without performing any additional
operations on the current socket.
CVE-2024-53124
Lun, 02/12/2024 – 14:15
CVE-2024-53124
net: fix data-races around sk->sk_forward_alloc
Syzkaller reported this warning:
————[ cut here ]————
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
Code: 24 12 4c 89 e2 5b 48 c7 c7 98 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 d1 18 17 ff 4c 89 e6 5b 48 c7 c7 d0 ec bb 82 41 5c e9 bf 18 17 ff 0f 0b eb 83 0b eb 97 0f 0b eb 87 0f 0b e9 68 ff ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bd90 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffff88810b172a90 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000300 RDI: ffff88810b172a00
RBP: ffff88810b172a00 R08: ffff888104273c00 R09: 0000000000100007
R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: ffff88810b172a00
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888237c31f78
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc63fecac8 CR3: 000000000342e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? __warn+0x88/0x130
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? inet_sock_destruct+0x1c5/0x1e0
__sk_destruct+0x2a/0x200
rcu_do_batch+0x1aa/0x530
? rcu_do_batch+0x13b/0x530
rcu_core+0x159/0x2f0
handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x2b0
? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
run_ksoftirqd+0x25/0x30
smpboot_thread_fn+0xdd/0x1d0
kthread+0xd3/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
—[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]—
Its possible that two threads call tcp_v6_do_rcv()/sk_forward_alloc_add()
concurrently when sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN with sk->sk_lock unlocked,
which triggers a data-race around sk->sk_forward_alloc:
tcp_v6_rcv
tcp_v6_do_rcv
skb_clone_and_charge_r
sk_rmem_schedule
__sk_mem_schedule
sk_forward_alloc_add()
skb_set_owner_r
sk_mem_charge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
__kfree_skb
skb_release_all
skb_release_head_state
sock_rfree
sk_mem_uncharge
sk_forward_alloc_add()
sk_mem_reclaim
// set local var reclaimable
__sk_mem_reclaim
sk_forward_alloc_add()
In this syzkaller testcase, two threads call
tcp_v6_do_rcv() with skb->truesize=768, the sk_forward_alloc changes like
this:
(cpu 1) | (cpu 2) | sk_forward_alloc
… | … | 0
__sk_mem_schedule() | | +4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_schedule() | +4096 = 8192
sk_mem_charge() | | -768 = 7424
| sk_mem_charge() | -768 = 6656
… | … |
sk_mem_uncharge() | | +768 = 7424
reclaimable=7424 | |
| sk_mem_uncharge() | +768 = 8192
| reclaimable=8192 |
__sk_mem_reclaim() | | -4096 = 4096
| __sk_mem_reclaim() | -8192 = -4096 != 0
The skb_clone_and_charge_r() should not be called in tcp_v6_do_rcv() when
sk->sk_state is TCP_LISTEN, it happens later in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock().
Fix the same issue in dccp_v6_do_rcv().